Excerpts again, read entirely an IntelliNews
Territory card: It is one thing to take Kursk. It is another thing entirely to keep it. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has called for a second peace summit in November to which Russia and China will be invited, as neither turned up to the failed Swiss peace summit held on June 16-17. Many analysts have suggested that Bankova was hoping to hang on to Kursk to gain a territorial card that could be swapped for some of the territory annexed or occupied by Russia. This view was then corroborated by senior presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak in an interview with Newsweek. But Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has already taken that card off the table, saying there will be no ceasefire negotiations with Kyiv as long as the AFU is in Kursk this week.
Putin politically undented: Putin has been embarrassed by the Kursk incursion, but not hurt. As bne IntelliNews’ correspondent in Moscow reported, Russians are largely unfazed by the incursion. The attitude can be summed up as setbacks happen in war, but they remain confident of the AFR ability to eject the AFU eventually.
On the ground
The AFU made rapid progress in Kursk after crossing the border, facing only a few conscripts guarding the frontier and defences largely designed to repel raids and not a major expeditionary force of somewhere between 10,000-20,000 heavily armed men. But despite the gains there are several serious strategic problems the AFU have to cope with.
The conscripts were returned in the prisoner exchange of a couple of days ago.
Too far away: Kursk is operationally remote from Ukraine’s supplies and the critical theatre of the war in Donbas, making it difficult to resupply, support with reinforcements, or withdraw if it comes to that.
Thinning the line: Ukraine is already operating with a serious manpower shortage and struggling to hold the line against Russia’s forces in Donbas, but what the Kursk incursion has done is dilute the AFU forces at a time when they need to concentrate them.
There are currently no less than five mechanised brigades (22nd, 54th, 61st, 88th, 116th), a territorial defence brigade (103rd), two Air Assault Brigades (80th and 82nd) and a variety of attached battalions – something like a dozen total brigade equivalents. But these are not full strength, but units cobbled together to create an elite strike force of between 7,000-12,000, according to various estimates, at the cost of draining their brigades of men and material.
Any widening of the front disproportionately burdens the AFU and extending the front line with an entirely new – and strategically isolated – axis of combat works against Ukraine’s already outnumbered force.
The irony here is if the goal was to divert Russian forces away from the battle in Donbas to ease the pressure on Ukrainian defenders, the reverse has happened as AFU troops have been diverted and weakened their defences instead. The crucial town of Pokrovsk is close to “being crushed”, The Economist reported on August 23, that would give Putin almost full control of the entire Donbas region – his stated war aim.
Russia has approximately 50 division equivalents on the line against perhaps 33 for Ukraine – an advantage that will stubbornly persist no matter how they are arranged on the line,” says Big Serge.
Time not on AFU side: There is a big difference between controlling and holding territory.
Coming in range: One of the disadvantages of the Kursk incursion is the AFU has had to bring up large amounts of equipment and precious Nato-supplied weapons systems into close range of Russia’s armaments
Donbas defence crumbling: Over the past week, the Russian army has captured an area of about 80 square kilometres and seized control of the settlements of Mykolaivka, Zhelanne, Orlivka, Lysychne, Ivanivka and Svyrydonivka, according to the Ukrainian milblogger DeepState – Moscow’s most significant military advance since May.
The latest is that Russia hit Ukraine overnight with a massive missile strike- I’ll try to get something of interest posted here on that and the Israeli/Lebanon exchange. Israeli leaders made a first strike (pre emptive) against Lebanon. And Israeli leaders are stating this isn’t over.
One reply on “Is Kursk Excursion a Major Blunder?”
The Ukrainian incursion in the Kursk region is a desperate gamble by a losing hand similar to the German Ardennes offensive at Christmas 1944 (the Battle of the Bulge). It’s surprise effect was heightened by it’s irrationality. When the possibility of nuclear weapons are involved the prospect that your adversary is acting irrationally is a scary scenario. This is political Chaos Theory and I suspect that it explains Putin’s cautious response and also that of the Iranian leadership who are very familiar with the “October Surprise” tradition in the American election cycle.