Turkey, Syria, Iran & The Adana Agreement

I’d made mention of the Adana Agreement in a previous post.

December 2016 the report below was featured at my prior digs. Nearly 5 years ago.. It was followed up with an additional two reports. My how time flies?!?!?!? Adana was mentioned in the report from the other day:

Turkey, Syria, Iran and the Adana Agreement: The End of Pax Adana

original url below-

Fortunately the article in it’s entirety can be found via the wayback

The Adana Agreement concerning the PKK has been mentioned here on more then one occasion. I’ve suggested people read up on it. Don’t know who has and who hasn’t however the time has come to write about it here.

I’m going to start with a link to an article from Washington Institute
Soner Cagaptay and Tyler Evans Hurriyet Daily News— (A news outlet I personally take issue with- NATO/ Atlanticist- Publisher of the blown out of proportion Erdogan quote- It’s agenda is obvious. It’s a source that always needs to be verified. Hurriyet is the favourite of many disinfo/misinfo sites)

Yes, all these years later, I still take issue with Hurriyet

The End of Pax Adana

Pax is the kiss of Peace Ecclesiastical. kiss of peace: a period in history marked by the absence of major wars, usually imposed by a predominant nation. Pax Adana means the end of  this long peace filled kiss.  Who wants this agreement to end? What nations will benefit when Iran, Turkey and Syria are torn to shreds? My readers know which nations will benefit- A nation born of brutal violence, death and displacement may just materialize- Greater Kurdistan. The last of a trio of other nations created in recent memory from brutality violence, death and displacement- Israel and Kosovo. The NATO terror trio.

“One of the unintended consequences of the Arab Spring has been the PKK’s reemergence as a player in Iran-Syria-Turkey relations.

Although Turkey is not an Arab country, the Arab Spring is shaping Turkish affairs in important ways. Political changes in the country’s neighborhood have ended the equilibrium between Syria, Turkey, and Iran over the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group that has waged a violent campaign against Turkey for decades. This has meant the end of the Pax Adana, a regional balance characterized by the Syrian and Iranian promise not to support the PKK.

In 1998, Damascus signed a protocol with Ankara in the southern Turkish city of Adana promising to cease its support for the PKK. Iran joined in on that consensus in 2003.

Now, Syrian and Iranian support for the PKK is back in the spotlight as Syria’s disintegration and Turkish-Iranian competition demolish the foundations of the former status quo.

Turkey has been down this road before. During the 1980s and 1990s, Iran supported the PKK to undermine Turkey’s secular democratic political system –– the regional antithesis to the Islamic republic’s authoritarian style of religious governance. Syria saw usefulness in the PKK as well.

For Hafez al-Assad, the PKK was a convenient instrument to help settle old scores over the disputed territory of Hatay — and more directly — to force Turkey’s hand on water-sharing disagreements from the Euphrates and the Tigris.

By the late 1990s, Ankara had run out of patience against Syria. Turkey beat the war drums by conducting NATO exercises in the region as well as independent mobilizations on the border with Syria.

In the face of Ankara’s threats, Syria signed the Adana Protocol in October 1998, shut down the PKK bases on its territory, imprisoned hundreds of PKK militants, and expelled PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan from Syria, leading to his capture in 1999.

For years since, Damascus has largely held up his end of the deal. One Turkish intelligence analyst even remarked that if Ankara wanted Syria to extradite a suspected PKK member, “Al-Assad would extradite not only that person, but all his cousins, as well.”

This was a good agreement for all parties. It kept the peace between Turkey, Syria and Iran regarding the PKK. It had them all on the same page. Iran signed on in 2003 because after the US invasion of Iraq the writing was on the wall..   Iraq’s disintegration was a foregone conclusion and a Greater Kurdistan aka Israel 2.0 was bound to appear. Turkey, Iran and Syria needed to keep their peace and work together to prevent their disintegration.

“This agreement underwrote a new pattern of friendly relations with Syria — and Iran jumped on board in 2003, concluding that winning Turkey’s approval should be part of its broader regional strategy. This shift was a reaction to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which prompted Tehran to decide it needed to win over its neighbor Turkey to balance the threat from the United States encircling Iran. Tehran therefore severed its ties with the PKK the day U.S. troops landed in Iraq.

These developments ushered in the era of Pax Adana. The PKK did not go away, but at least it was prevented from becoming an irritant to the stability of regional relationships.
With the advent of the Arab Spring, this era met its sudden demise: Syria’s consequent implosion has placed Iran and Turkey in an unquestionably adversarial position as Turkey leads the anti-al-Assad camp while Iran is committed to supporting the essential regional asset it sees in the al-Assad regime.

Accordingly, Tehran has an incentive to bring the PKK card back into play in order to make Turkey take its concerns seriously. Last year, Iran’s semi-official news agency, Press TV, reported that Iran had captured the PKK’s second-in-command, Murat Karayilan. The air of mystery Iran cultivated around the alleged capture gave the clear impression that Iran was brandishing its PKK clout against Turkey. Recently, Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Bulent Arinc charged that the PKK had relocated some of its bases from Iraq to the Turkish-Iranian border. The U.S. ambassador to Turkey, Francis Ricciardone, echoed these charges when he claimed that Damascus was providing Iranian arms to the PKK.

For the PKK, the demise of the Pax Adana is a new opportunity. With newfound traction in Syria and Iran, the PKK has recently launched a renewed campaign of violence against Turkey.
Revolutions can usher in changes in unexpected ways. One of the unintended consequences of the Arab Spring has been the demolition of the Pax Adana and the reemergence of the PKK as a player in regional politics between Iran, Syria and Turkey, once again.”

Soner Cagaptay is director of the Turkish Research Program at The Washington Institute. Tyler Evans is a research assistant in the program.

 I completely disagree that the reemergence of the PKK was a so called unintended consequence of the bogus Arab spring. It was an intentional reemergence/consequence
Part of the remake of the entire region- The PKK playing the role they have played for so long…. Years ago I called them a NATO stay behind army- That’s their role. Along with drug running, human smuggling, and worse.

Turkey’s entry into Northern Syria- Operation Euphrates Shield

 It seems very likely and perfectly sensible that Turkey & Syria had an understanding regarding  what would occur should Syria fail to uphold the responsibilities agreed upon in Adana.
*Thinking rationally about the Adana agreement and all it entails regarding PKK and company
*Thinking rationally about Turkey’s attempt to secure it’s southern border- By building a wall and entering Syria.

Operation Euphrates Shield appears to be response to Syria’s failure to uphold the Adana Deal

Bashar al Assad would have known that Turkey would undertake these actions.  In fact, one should entertain the possibility that Syria did not focus on the northern border with the idea that Turkey would intervene. Allowing Syria to focus attention elsewhere. With the benefit of Russia’s watchful eye and guidance.

Background, briefly.

 I’m addressing the issue with the PKK and the Adana Agreement as it concerned Syria’s dalliances with the PKK to the chagrin of Turkey. Syria under Bashar’s father Hafeez was quite happy to allow the PKK to use Syrian territory as a base of operations. In order to be a thorn in the side of it’s neighbour- Turkey. Going so far as to keep the terrorist Ocalan safely in Syria. (Living in luxury apparently)

This nearly brought Syria and Turkey to war. It was a war Syria was in no position to win.

Let’s go back to 1998-

The crisis started when Gen. Atilla Ates, commander of the Turkish land forces, spoke near the Syrian border on Sept. 16. Ates, called on Damascus to expel Abdullah Ocalan and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).

The drums of war echoed throughout the Middle East as Turkish tanks seemed poised to roll into Syria. Unwilling to go to war, the government of Hafez al-Assad, father of the current Syrian president, complied with Ankara’s demand and expelled Ocalan.

Turkey gave Syria a choice- Get rid of Ocalan, stop sustaining these terrorists, or we will invade. If Turkey was a truly despicable nation state, with expansionist tendencies, like ISRAEL ( a nation that uses any excuse to steal territory/resources with the excuse of protecting itself ) Turkey’s leadership wouldn’t have even given Syria the option. They would have simply invaded. With the help of NATO, assuredly. Turkey did not do that in 1998.

 Maybe Syria’s relations with Russia at the time impeded Turkey?
Presently Operation Euphrates Shield is not supported by the US or any other NATO so called allies..

After the incident in 1998. Hafeez Assad quickly sent Ocalan out of the country. Ocalan ended up in Greece. Not a surprise, really. Given Greece’s big time NATO subservience. But Greece didn’t want him for reasons I shouldn’t need to get into here.

-Interview with the Greek Intelligence Officer involved in the affair discussing how it was the Americans finally got Ocalan sent to Africa- Kenya, specifically, where they and Israel had influence:

With Abdullah Ocalan From Athens to Nairobi 
Exclusive interview with former Greek intelligence officer Savvas Kalenteridis –

Q: When did you first meet Mr. Ocalan?

A: I met him after he was forced to leave Syria and came to Greece. On October 10, 1998 the Greek government asked me to accompany Ocalan in a plane to Russia. The Syrian government gave Ocalan four days to leave their country. Meanwhile, Ocalan had contacted a Greek MP in order to help him find a way to stay in Greece. Ocalan arrived in Athens from Damascus on a Syrian Airlines plane, which was going to Stockholm, the Swedish capital.

Eventually Ocalan went to Kenya-

No one wanted to shelter this man- He was a political hot potato. His cult like followers are violent- His female aids threatened to burn themselves in protest- When Ocalan was finally caught…………

“The arrest ignited a series of violent attacks on Kenyan, Israeli, Turkish and Greek Embassies in Europe. In a series of a coordinated attacks, the Kurdish protesters broke into embassies and consulates threatened to immolate themselves and their hostages. Then 14 men and two women broke into the Kenyan Embassy in Paris and held several Kenyan diplomats hostage for three hours. Another group lay siege on the Kenyan Embassy in Bonn, Germany.

For several days and in some instances, weeks, Kurdish protesters made life in several Kenya’s embassies in Europe a living hell, although the Greek and Turkish embassies got by far more savagery”

The PKK’s wacked out followers are violent. Crazed cultists. Get it?! This is not all the Kurdish people, this is sadly a large enough segment of fanatical sunni muslim kurds, both dangerous and violent, who will stop at nothing to advance their cult agenda even if it means killing other kurds, arabs, who ever may get in their way- As evidenced by the abundance of abuses the PKK/YPG/TAK etc are engaging in as proxies of the US and Israel.

That’s a tiny bit of the background as it relates to Syria sheltering terrorists.

Additional background info to consider:

Statement Made By İsmail Cem, Foreign Minister, On The Special Security Meeting Held Between Turkey And Syria October 20, 1998 (Unofficial Translation)

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