Readers here may recall the not so long ago attempt at colour revolution in Georgia. Not the first attempt, the most recent attempt that didn’t go the way the US had hoped
Last written about in January of this year
We’ve also recently touched on the Armenia/Azeri situation and control of the pivotal, crucial corridor
GISReports
Some excerpts below, read entirely at the link directly above
U.S. eyes greater influence in the South Caucasus
The South Caucasus, comprising Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, has been a focal point for geopolitical tensions for many years. Russia has historically played a strong role in influencing this region. The current administration of President Donald Trump sees both opportunities and challenges in deepening the United States’ engagement there and in Central Asia, where energy and critical resources are in relative abundance. With China’s expanding reach and assertive moves by Russia and Iran, Washington has strong incentives to bolster its presence
Russia’s war in Ukraine shapes South Caucasus geopolitics
In recent years, Russia’s role as the main mediator and security provider in the South Caucasus has diminished, largely due to its ongoing war in Ukraine, the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and the 2022-2023 Blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh. The outcome of Russia’s war on Ukraine will undoubtedly play a pivotal role in South Caucasus dynamics.
To maintain its military efforts, Moscow has redirected resources from the region to the front in Ukraine. Furthermore, Russia has relied heavily on trade to bypass sanctions and market restrictions imposed by Western countries. According to a 2024 report by Oxford Economics, Moscow draws on:
A re-routing of trade flows to circumvent EU restrictions on the shipment of goods by Russian companies and sanctions against Russian financial institutions. … Furthermore, some ex-Soviet Union countries are expanding their manufacturing sectors to export more to Russia, thereby exploiting gaps left by the departure of Western companies from the Russian market.
Russia relies on the region as an avenue to bypass Western sanctions and, as a result, benefits from the status quo. Each of the three countries has pursued a distinct path, leading them to consider how the outcome of the war in Ukraine might shape Russia’s future plans for reengagement in the South Caucasus, the Caspian Basin and Moscow’s ability to reassert its sphere of influence.
Political turmoil in Georgia as Russian influence remains
Georgia, situated at the intersection of Europe and Asia, has faced significant political instability in recent years, marked by contested elections and prolonged public protests against the government, which is led by the pro-Kremlin Georgian Dream Party. Despite these challenges, the government’s policies – heavily shaped by billionaire and former Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, the country’s wealthiest individual and a figure sanctioned by the U.S. and some European countries – aim to maintain relations with Russia and China.
Despite a history of strained relations, the U.S. has significant interests in Georgia. The country plays a crucial role in the Middle Corridor, linking Central Asia, the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus with the Black Sea, Europe and Turkey. The development of these corridors enhances global supply chain resilience and limits opportunities for China, Iran and Russia to interfere.
As a littoral state, Georgia could help maintain a free and open Black Sea. However, Russia, since invading Georgia in 2008, occupies 20 percent of the country’s territory, namely the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Additionally, Moscow is building a new Russian naval base in Abkhazia.
Washington has raised apprehensions about China’s involvement in Georgia’s Anaklia deep-water port situated on the eastern edge of the Black Sea, citing security, political and economic implications. Meanwhile, Tehran is actively developing a North-South Corridor connecting Russia to Iran through Georgia, a route that could reduce the regime’s vulnerability to economic and political isolation from the U.S.
Armenia’s shift toward Western alliances
The present Armenian government is clearly distancing itself from the country’s longstanding alignment with Moscow, pursuing closer ties with Europe and the U.S. In April, the government enacted a law establishing a legal basis for the South Caucasus nation to progress toward EU membership. In early 2025, Armenia signed a strategic partnership charter with the U.S. Since 2021, the EU and Armenia have been party to the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement. Meanwhile, the country upholds trade and diplomatic relations with Moscow and Tehran, while striving to reopen its closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenia also enjoys cordial relations with Georgia, which has facilitated several trilateral efforts with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The strategic objectives of Armenia’s current government align closely with U.S. interests. Armenia’s pivot toward a pro-Western stance, its efforts to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan and normalize relations with Turkey can significantly enhance regional stability if maintained and built upon.
This is critical for the development of the Middle Corridor (also known as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route or Central Asia-Caspian-Caucasus Corridor), which aims to link Chinese and European markets via Central Asia and the Caucasus. The corridor advances U.S. goals by offering regional countries a trade alternative to the North-South corridor from Russia to Iran. The route can foster diversified supply chains, open new markets, and secure energy and resource access for Western countries, while limiting the influence of Russia and Iran. Moreover, in parallel with its new critical minerals agreement with Kyiv, the U.S. is also actively pursuing mining and processing agreements in Armenia, as part of its global strategy to counter China’s dominance in rare earths and critical minerals production.
The Trump administration is likely to continue constructive engagement with Armenia.
Included above is half of the information available at the GIS link