Russian gas has stopped flowing to Europe, leaving Transnistria without an energy supply. Moldova, dependent on electricity from the breakaway region, is now facing soaring inflation months away from a crucial parliamentary election

Why has Russian gas stopped flowing to Europe? Well, when we read the above linked oped we may conclude that this stoppage just happened. It did happen, but, it happened because Ukraine stopped the transit. That's right Ukraine stopped the gas from flowing.

Russian gas era in Europe ends as Ukraine stops transit

Russia’s gas firm Gazprom said it had stopped at 0500 GMT after Ukraine refused to renew a transit agreement.

No agreement, no contract, no gas.. It’s on Ukraine. I’ll say it again the gas does not flow because Ukraine refused to renew a transit agreement.

Back to ECFR oped;

Problem

Transnistria has so far refused Moldova’s help. Russia could also supply Transnistria through the TurkStream pipeline. But by leaving Transnistria out in the cold, Moscow is hoping to weaken the pro-European government in Chisinau in the run-up to the parliamentary election due by the summer. Because Moldova proper is now not getting its normal electricity supply from Transnistria, it has been forced to buy half its electricity from Romania. Tariffs have already doubled. Moscow hopes this will trigger a second wave of inflation after Chisinau successfully reduced it to 5%. While pro-European president Maia Sandu was narrowly re-elected in November, her party is not as popular and faces a difficult election campaign – especially up against the Kremlin’s latest push.

To boost its efforts, Russia is also running a coordinated disinformation campaign to blame the government – as with recent coordinated statements by the Russian embassy in Moldova and Transnistrian ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs’. These statements blame Ukraine and the West for the crisis, claiming that “some ‘hotheads’ are proposing to resolve the Transnistrian issue by force”.

Solution

The European Union should be aware that this is a part of Russia’s broader destabilisation of Moldova. To convince Transnistria to accept help and supply Moldova’s electricity, the EU could support Moldova in energy round-tripping: Moldova can buy gas for Transnistria, which helps it make electricity, which Moldova then buys. To finance the added cost, the EU could top up Moldova’s Energy Efficiency Fund and donate more to the EU- and UN-led Energy Vulnerability Reduction Fund. In previous crises, this has helped Chisinau compensate for higher tariffs.

Above all, Moldova needs more resources to combat Russian election interference, particularly in information warfare. Moldova has produced some excellent pro-EU videos; but the government and civil society needs to operate on a much bigger scale to compete with pro-Russian efforts on Telegram and through local influencers. The EU can achieve a lot by helping Moldova blame the right people for the current crisis.

The right people to blame are in Ukraine. That’s obvious enough

Context

Transnistria was unprepared for the cut-off. The authorities talked about large reserves and switching to coal; but its main electricity station uses specific coal from the Donbas in occupied Ukraine and reserves are likely to run out by the end of January. What began as one or two hours of power cuts are now reaching eight hours a day. Industry and water supply are also affected. School holidays have been extended to 20 January. For the moment, Transnistria seems to have been told to suffer. Russia will then likely provide humanitarian relief, just as electricity supplies were resumed to Abkhazia in December. The narrative of ‘saving’ Russian-speakers will swing into action, as will the narrative that this option was denied to Moldova proper by its government. Or Russia may continue the crisis to further pressure

Eight hours a day with no electricity? This article say's it's 5 hours daily. All players are going to spin to their own advantage. Either way it’s got to be difficult.

Atlantic Council- Moldova is the real loser from the end of Russian gas transit through Ukraine

I guess Ukraine’s leadership just didn’t care enough about Moldova?

A combination of circumstance, Russian malign influence, and its own failure to prepare has left Moldova the country hardest hit by the end of Russian gas transit through Ukraine. Upon the January 1, 2025, cessation of transit, Moldova finds itself in an energy crisis and facing political instability. The Russian-backed separatist region of Transnistria is experiencing major power cuts and is without an alternate source of gas, having rejected bailout offers from the European Union (EU) and Chișinău. The rest of Moldova is suffering from its reliance on Transnistria for electricity, as well as Chișinău’s consolidation of its gas market under the majority Russian-owned company Moldovagaz. Neither the Moldovan government nor Transnistria were prepared for the long-anticipated post-Russian gas transit reality.

The five-year natural gas transit contract between Russia’s Gazprom and Ukraine’s Naftogaz expired on January 1, ending a long history of Russian gas reaching Europe—and Moldova’s 2.5 million citizens—through Ukrainian pipelines. Kyiv elected not to extend the contract because, although it was earning approximately $800 million per year in transit revenue

Apparently Kiev doesn’t need the 800 million dollars, yearly?? Since they’re being propped up by western governments?

But whereas Moldova proper, on the “Left Bank” of the Dniester, can import both electricity and gas from Europe—at a massively higher price than it was paying for Russian gas—the Right Bank has refused offers of in kind aid, including humanitarian aid and generators, as well as financial support from Europe with which to get through the winter. Buoyed by foreign assistance funds, Chișinău offered to help Transnistria buy gas and power imports from Europe, but the Right Bank has thus far declined any assistance. Instead, Transnistria seems to be waiting for Russia to turn the gas taps back on

Failure to prepare

This situation is years in the making. Moldova is one of the world’s most energy insecure countries and has long been reliant on Russian gas transited through Ukraine. Despite Moldova’s declaration of independence at the fall of the Soviet Union and much more recent disavowal of Russian gas, Russia’s majority state-owned gas giant Gazprom owns a 51 percent stake in Moldova’s state-owned gas company, Moldovagaz, and it has remained the country’s sole source of gas, whether directly or indirectly supplied. 

Meanwhile, Transnistria houses Moldova’s only power plant, the Ciciurgan gas-fueled station, which it sold in 2004 to a Russian state-owned enterprise. Chișinău does not recognize the sale. Although Moldova has been importing some electricity from the EU, it is nonetheless dependent on Transnistrian electricity for about 70 percent of its needs. Moreover, the only high-voltage transmission line through which Moldova can import European electricity passes through Transnistria, although a new transmission line to Romania is currently under construction. In practice, this means that the Left Bank depends on the Right Bank for power, and the Right Bank depends on the Left Bank for the gas to generate that electricity. Historically, each has found this arrangement convenient for less than strictly above-board reasons. It was also a very affordable arrangement so long as Russia was providing the gas, so both sides have therefore long been dependent on Russia. 

https://english.nv.ua/nation/ukraine-is-ready-to-help-moldova-with-transnistria-50305618.html

Remember it was Zelensky that claimed to have intelligence regarding a coup plot?

Remember that Moldova’s government çollapsed and and a new government was appointed. Including new “leadership”

Looks as if my concerns were legitimate.

Ukraine to suspend key Russia gas transit point to Europe

Kyiv says it will suspend the flow of gas through a transit point which it says delivers almost a third of Russian fuel to Europe via Ukraine. The country’s gas grid operator said it would stop shipments via the Sokhranivka route from Wednesday.

No civilians in Azavastol:

Despite what ever claims might be made by Kiev. Those that wanted to leave have had ample opportunity to do so. Those that choose to stay are fighters. Foreign and otherwise.

The Ukrainazi’s have released a bunch of images of themselves as an SOS.

The Vatican and Nazis: History Repeats?

Pope Francis met the wives of two officers from Ukraine’s Azov battalion that is trapped inside Mariupol’s Azovstal steel plant.

Claimed History: The Ratlines-

Record Breaking Inflation Began Well Before Russia/Ukraine Conflict

However, inflation has risen steadily since Biden took office, starting at 1.4% the month he was sworn in, reaching 5% by May, 7% by November, and now 8.5%. Gas prices, which Russia sanctions most directly affect due to the country’s status as a major oil exporter, were also high ahead of the invasion.

In case the above analysis is too partisan for you?
Bloomberg and the Original headline: Inflation was deepening even before Russia/Ukraine- What’s coming now..

https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-03-11/inflation-was-deepening-even-before-ukraine-what-s-coming-now-over-to-the-fed

Data released Thursday on consumer price inflation and wage rises in the U.S. predate Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The key read-through is that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is not going to force central banks off their course. (Interest rate hikes)

Russia’s separatist ‘empire’: long term challenges

The view from the Britain’s world.

Russia has stoked, managed and supported many pro-Russian separatist conflicts in the post-Soviet space. Although having ethnic aspects, these conflicts are in fact geopolitical in nature and utilised by Moscow to prevent the Euro-Atlantic integration of countries to its west and south, notably Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia. The leveraging of these separatist conflicts for geopolitical gain has become a key element of Moscow’s strategic calculus.

Russia’s policy towards these conflicts has been conditioned by various factors, such as the influence of regional powers, particularly Turkey and Iran, military calculations, and fluctuating bilateral ties with states neighbouring Russia (Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan). Although it is difficult to see the emergence of a clear Russian strategy in the 1990s and early 2000s towards these conflicts, by early 2022 (as evidenced by Russia officially recognising[] the independence of the Donetsk People’s Republic [DPR] and Luhansk People’s Republic [LPR] as a prelude to its renewed offensive against Ukraine), it is clear that the stoking and management of them has turned into a key part of Russia’s grand strategy.

Short term successes

Russia’s strategy is intrinsically linked to this contest between Russia and free and open nations – particularly those of Europe – over the political, economic, and military future of these territories that border Russia to its west and south. As many of these states seek membership into the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), Russia endeavours to pull them back under its influence by deterring their membership through military coercion and the instigation of separatism, whilst simultaneously attempting to expand regional groupings where it has power to incorporate them, such as the Eurasian Economic Union.

So far, this strategy has produced tangible results through stalling the enlargement of the EU and NATO into the wider Black Sea region, notably Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. However, Russia is now facing a range of long-term challenges in managing the various seperatist conflicts and territories it helped establish – its seperatist ‘empire’. These stem from geographic factors, Russia’s economic support to them, the international legitimacy of these territories, and the continued aspiration for greater Euro-Atlantic integration evident in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Long term challenges

First is the challenge posed by geography. In the early years after the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia only had to oversee separatist conflicts in small and impoverished Georgia and Moldova. Now, however, the Kremlin has to manage a range of geographically dispersed territories from Transnistria to Nagorno-Karabakh that rely heavily on Russia for stability, particularly through its military presence. These territories are often difficult to reach, and their societies politically unstable. Transnistria has been an especially interesting case since 2014, when Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea created logistical issues that made it increasingly difficult to reach the territory.

Ukraine created the blockade of Transnistria- Crimea’s request to rejoin Russia would have made passage to Transnistria easier without Kiev’s move to block)

Second is the economic woes, in which Russia has failed to come up with a long-term strategy to address. Creating a single economic union with the separatist territories is not possible, and real economic benefits are hard to foster in societies so unstable and consumed by armed conflict. The poor financial infrastructure of these territories further hinders Russia’s financial involvement. (If we don’t think in terms of the silk road initiative)

Furthermore, there is inherent fragility in the economic relationship between Russia and the separatist territories it supports due to their economic over-reliance on Russia. The effect of Covid-19 on the territory of Abkhazia encapsulates this well. The tourist industry – which accounts[] for nearly one-third of gross domestic product and is dominated by Russian visitors – was decimated, and Abkhaz leaders found it harder to extract necessary finances from their superiors in the Kremlin, who were also trying to manage the ramifications of a global pandemic. This has led to a budgetary crisis and the rekindling[] of conversations in Abkhazia about possible economic rapprochement with Tbilisi.

Then there is the effect of the sanctions imposed[] on Russia following its renewed invasion of Ukraine. Although not bringing the war to a halt in the short-term, the sanctions will hinder Russia’s economic and industrial potential in the long-term. Indeed, its economy is set to see its biggest contraction[] in decades (???) and the apparent stability of the ruble has been cautioned as illusory[]. (???) This will have a significant impact on the separatist territories’ ability to build a viable economy and retain a semblance of economic independence from Russia.

Another problem for Moscow and its separatist ‘empire’ is the lack of international legitimacy afforded to these territories. In the case of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali, only Russia, Syria, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru have given them formal recognition. Other states will now be even less likely to recognise them, as well as the DPR, LPR and Transnistria, as a result of Russia’s tarnished image stemming from its renewed aggression against Ukraine. The legality and legitimacy of these territories that Russia has previously stressed is now in shambles.

So, you’re getting the idea that this is written with a particular world view/slant? Sort of that self congratulatory, we’ve got this all sorted out attitude that’s not addressing the reality. Rather it’s describing a specific world view- Britain’s view.

Conclusion

Taking a long term view, it seems that Russia’s strategy to stop the Euro-Atlantic integration of the post-Soviet space has not yielded the expected results. While it is true that Moscow has deterred some of its neighbours from joining the EU and NATO, its gamble that fuelling and supporting pro-Russian separatist conflicts would undermine the pro-European resolve of Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine has largely failed. As the required finances and military support becomes ever more demanding, Moscow may find itself overstretched, and its separatist ‘empire’ collapsing.

Emil Avdaliani is a professor at European University and the Director of Middle East Studies at Georgian think-tank, Geocase.

We shall see if the conclusion matches what ever is yet to occur real world?

hattippin’ BMan!

I like it.

The flashback to the 2015 report from my big tech censored blog was well timed. It seemed something was just over the horizon. I’ll relink the 2015 report at the end of this latest

There have been reports of explosions in Transinistria. Russia has troops and bases there. It doesn’t seem likely to me that they’d need to attack the area to justify any move they may or may not be planning towards the territory. It’s tough to understand the necessity to create a false flag in an area full of Russian people and military. With it’s own independent government already in existence. Thoughts?

A bit of history: RT

Transnistria : Its economic structure was very different from the rest of the republic. Unlike agrarian Moldova, Transnistria was primarily an industrial area. Despite it accounting for just 17 percent of Moldova’s population and very small portion of its territory, by the late Soviet period, its industry provided 40 percent of the republic’s GDP and up to 90 percent of its electricity.

In Transnistria, the majority of the population was made up of Slavs – Russians and Ukrainians. For obvious reasons, Moldovan nationalism, which came with a revival of ties with Romania, did not find any support in Transnistria at all.

Finally, another important detail from 1992…” the Soviet 14th Army was based in Transnistria. Though its complex of military facilities were more akin to giant arsenals than a full-fledged combat-ready contingent, there were enough weapons to arm one. Furthermore, there were many retired officers living in Transnistria who kept in touch with each other and formed a fairly influential ‘corporation’ in the region.

On September 2, the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic was already proclaimed at the Congress of deputies of Transnistria. It was headed by an ethnic Russian named Igor Smirnov – the son of a school principal and a journalist, who had worked in industry all his life. Though he had lived in Transnistria only since the 80’s, Smirnov was the director of an electrical plant in Tiraspol and was already well-known in the region.

Transdniestrians were motivated by several considerations. On the one hand, given the newly proclaimed Moldovan government’s clumsy actions and its rhetoric, in particular, people were afraid of discrimination by nationalists. On the other, many people wanted either to preserve the Soviet way and order of life, or vice versa, wanted financial concessions for Moldova’s most economically important region.

https://news.yahoo.com/moldova-security-talks-blasts-russia-095058547.html

The breakaway region of Transnistria said there were explosions on Monday and Tuesday in the security ministry, a military unit and a radio tower belonging to Russia, and called them “terrorist attacks”.

The Kremlin expressed “concern” over the explosions. Russian state news agency RIA Novosti quoted a source in the Transnistria government as saying that attackers had entered from Ukraine.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the world’s largest security body, condemned “all attempts to destabilise (the) situation” in Transnistria and its buffer zone.

Two explosions hit a radio tower re-broadcasting Russian stations near the Ukrainian border early Tuesday, the interior ministry of the breakaway region said.

It also said offices of the state security ministry in the main city Tiraspol were hit by what appeared to be a grenade-launcher attack on Monday evening, a public holiday for Orthodox Easter.

Windows and doors were blown out and smoke was “billowing out of the buildings”, a statement said.

Transnistria’s security council said a military unit had been hit in the village of Parkany near the main city of Tiraspol.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/moldovaplacessecurity-forces-on-alertafter-blasts-in-breakaway-state-of-transnistria-11650990230

Moldova Places Security Forces on Alert After Blasts in Breakaway State of Transnistria

Moldova said it was placing its security forces on alert Tuesday following a series of explosions in Transnistria, a breakaway pro-Russian enclave that has stirred concern over the role that some 1,500 Russian troops stationed there could play in shoring up Moscow’s military campaign in neighboring Ukraine.

Attacks in pro-Russian breakaway republic risk spillover of the war in neighboring Ukraine

What sparked the tensions was a May 21 vote in Ukraine’s parliament to suspend military co-operation with Russia. That included a 1995 agreement giving Russia military transit rights across Ukraine to reach Transnistria, which borders Ukraine’s Odessa region.

Russian peacekeepers have been deployed in the unrecognised statelet since its brief war for independence from ex-Soviet Moldova in 1992, and Russia has a base there with about 1,350 soldiers and heavy weapons. 

https://pennyforyourthoughts2.blogspot.com/2015/06/transnistria-moldova-ukraine-will.html

https://web.archive.org/web/20151018041722/https://pennyforyourthoughts2.blogspot.com/2015/06/transnistria-moldova-ukraine-will.html

As my blog looked ‘back in the day’!

Interesting too is that there was a pipeline of terrorists and cash flowing through Moldova in 2015. Where did the thugs and the money go?

https://pennyforyourthoughts2.blogspot.com/2015/05/moldova-jihadi-stop-1-billion-missing.html

1/8 of Moldova’s GDP simply evaporates from it’s banking system?

We’re they laundering money? I don’t know? But that was just weird news.