---
title: "Analysis: Ukraine’s bold and risky gamble in Kursk"
type: "post"
post_id: "6850"
slug: "analysis-ukraines-bold-and-risky-gamble-in-kursk"
canonical: "https://pennyforyourthoughts2.ca/2024/08/09/analysis-ukraines-bold-and-risky-gamble-in-kursk/"
markdown_url: "https://pennyforyourthoughts2.ca/2024/08/09/analysis-ukraines-bold-and-risky-gamble-in-kursk.md"
json_url: "https://pennyforyourthoughts2.ca/2024/08/09/analysis-ukraines-bold-and-risky-gamble-in-kursk.json"
txt_url: "https://pennyforyourthoughts2.ca/2024/08/09/analysis-ukraines-bold-and-risky-gamble-in-kursk.txt"
published: "2024-08-09T21:58:07+00:00"
modified: "2024-08-09T22:21:26+00:00"
author: "penny2"
categories:
  - "Uncategorized"
tags:
  - "Russia"
  - "Ukraine"
  - "US"
site_name: "PFYT2"
publisher: ""
language: "en-US"
generator: "easyPress Markdown"
generator_version: "1.0.6"
---
**There’s quite a lot of sensational reporting on this situation which isn’t what I’m after. The piece linked and excerpted below seems more measured. So, share some thoughts on this article from** [FDD’s Longwarjournal](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/08/analysis-ukraines-bold-and-risky-gamble-in-kursk.php)

**And read entirely at the link**.

###### **I’m going to put this news here also, because there has to be a connection– Was this operation timed to coincide with.. [US announces 125 million in additional aid](https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-equipment-artillery-munitions-blinken-kirby/33073060.html)**??

> **The United States on August 9 announced $125 million in new military aid for Kyiv as Ukrainian forces push ahead with a surprise offensive inside Russian territory. The aid package underscores “our unwavering commitment to \[Ukraine\] as they continue to battle back against Russian aggression,**

**`Longwarjournal`**

Now on its fourth day, **Ukraine’s surprise offensive in Russia’s Kursk region is a daring gambit likely intended to divert Russian forces and snatch back the war’s momentum**. But i**t also comes with major risks for a Ukrainian military short on reserves and struggling to hold back Russian advances in Donetsk Oblast.**

**What we know so far**

**Much about the Ukrainian offensive is still unclear. Kyiv has remained tight-lipped, and Ukrainian units have released scant battlefield footage.** **`What little information` is available comes chiefly from Russian-released videos `as well as a whirlwind of unconfirmed—and often contradictory—reports on Telegram.`**

Here is what we currently know: Following an artillery [bombardment](https://t.me/milinfolive/127719), Ukrainian forces attacked across the border between the Sumy and Kursk regions on the morning of August 6. They initially advanced in two directions: east to the border town of Sudzha and north toward the town of Korenevo.

Though the attacking force’s precise size and composition remain unclear, the offensive is certainly larger in scale and ambition than Ukraine’s previous cross-border operations.**` Those raids were conducted by units subordinate to Ukrainian military intelligence, whereas this offensive includes regular forces.`**

**Since the Ukrainian military intelligence units are involved then so is the US.** **Without question.**

> [The Spy War: How the CIA Helps Ukraine Fight Putin](https://pennyforyourthoughts2.ca/2024/02/25/the-spy-war-how-the-cia-helps-ukraine-fight-putin/)



> ***One officer in the unit was Kyrylo Budanov, now the general leading Ukraine’s military intelligence.***
> 
> **The direct connection between US and Ukraine intelligence- Budanov.**

**At this point, Ukraine has probably committed battalions from at least several different brigades.** The [attacking](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821522061778354199) forces [appear](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821707929331834982) to have mainly included [mechanized](https://x.com/johnh105/status/1821517472551276962) and [motorized](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821238608986079603) infantry, plus some [tanks](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821624531322077272) along with [engineering](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821244057072365660) [vehicles](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821208611156066764) to clear mines and other obstacles. Ukrainian self-propelled [artillery](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821812563870375969) seems to be supporting the advancing forces.

**Considering the lack of Ukrainian forces this is definitely a gamble**

Although there had been [warnings](https://t.me/dva_majors/48572) about a Ukrainian buildup in Sumy Oblast in the days prior to the offensive**, the attack evidently caught Russia off guard.** Ukrainian operational security seems to have been [tight](https://www.economist.com/europe/2024/08/08/ukraine-surprises-with-a-high-stakes-raid-into-russia). **Russia left the border weakly defended, [protected](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821587233666646362) mainly by conscript and border guard units.** (Note that in the Russian system, conscripts—people completing their obligatory one year of military service—are distinct from mobilized troops and prohibited from fighting inside Ukraine.) **The Russian defense was prepared to stop small-scale raids but not a sizeable force.** **Ukraine exploited this surprise with a highly mobile force that advanced rapidly into Russian territory, overrunning or bypassing defensive positions near the border.**

**Ukrainian forces surrounded and ultimately [captured](https://x.com/Danspiun/status/1821242299377914178) some 50 Russian troops at the Sudzha border checkpoint. Ukraine [reportedly](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/20088) met minimal resistance at the nearby village of Oleshnya and also surrounded Russian troops in Gornal, south of Sudzha. The Ukrainians [quickly](https://x.com/johnh105/status/1821535679169409517) [reached](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821624531322077272) Sudzha’s [environs](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821710360920863060) and appear to have [taken](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821905655298429214) at least part of the town. But a large chunk of the Ukrainian force seems to have [turned left](https://t.me/EjShahidenko/3125) at Sudzha, pressing northward along the road connecting that town to Lgov. As of August 8, Ukrainian troops had [reached](https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/08/europe/russia-ukrainian-incursion-intl/index.html?cid=ios_app) Malaya Loknya, a village roughly 13 kilometers from the border,` though they <a href="https://x.com/johnh105/status/1821560639116161028">apparently</a> met at least some resistance there.`**

 **Meanwhile, Ukrainian forces [pressed north](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821238608986079603) from the area around the villages of [Dar’ino](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821530727529300265) and [Serdlikovo](https://x.com/johnh105/status/1821517472551276962) after reportedly meeting some [initial resistance](https://t.me/DeepStateUA/20088).** Footage released on social media indicates that by August 7, the Ukrainians had [progressed](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821276566766395464) at least [12 kilometers](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821253702629359837) from the border to the area around [Novoivanovka](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821631730895483019).

 **Some Russian Telegram channels have reported fighting near [Korenevo](https://t.me/rybar/62546) to the northwest, [Anastas’evka](https://t.me/dva_majors/49096) and [Kromskie Byki](https://t.me/rusich_army/16342) to the north, and [Bol’shoe Soldatskoe](https://t.me/rybar/62567) northeast of Sudzha. Some of these claims are [disputed](https://t.me/RVvoenkor/74302), however**. These reports may reflect Ukrainian [sabotage-reconnaissance groups](https://t.me/bayraktar1070/2542) operating ahead of the main force.

 **Video footage indicates Russia has used [attack helicopters](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821219244740075667) and [Su-25 attack aircraft](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821211535689314526), artillery [fire](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821530727529300265) (including [Krasnopol](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821266474847322256) laser-guided shells), [Lancet](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821624531322077272) [loitering](https://x.com/johnh105/status/1821535679169409517) [munition](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821203244552475045) [strikes](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821812563870375969), and [Iskander-M](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821253702629359837) ballistic [missile](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821239029423124911)** strikes to support ground troops trying to stem the Ukrainian advance**. In addition, reports by the Ukrainian [General](https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/16545) [Staff](https://t.me/GeneralStaffZSU/16535) and the [Sumy](https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/28809) [regional](https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/28828) [government](https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/28831), along with [Russian](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821222873366974646)–[released](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821295338780766672) [footage](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821938740702372182), indicate Su-34 strike fighters have launched many dozens of glide bombs at targets in the Sumy and Kursk regions**.

**Russia has begun dispatching forces to try to contain and roll back the Ukrainian advance, though it remains unclear exactly which units Moscow has sent.** **What is known is that a [Chechen spetsnaz](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821546960878239748) detachment that had been fighting in northern Kharkiv Oblast claims to have redeployed to Kursk on August 6.** Russia reportedly also sent forces from the [“Pyatnashka” Brigade](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821702743968362890), which had been fighting at Chasiv Yar in Donetsk Oblast, as well as a detachment of former [Wagner Group](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821646468706660442) fighters

 –**Russian [tanks](https://x.com/naalsio26/status/1821259298657464385) were [seen](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821643070901047382) moving on August 7 and 8. Their tactical symbols indicate they came from Russia’s “Sever” grouping, responsible for northern Kharkiv Oblast and Russia’s Bryansk, Kursk, and Belgorod regions. Moscow [probably had](https://x.com/Tatarigami_UA/status/1820833694040416415) at least some available reserves in those regions or elsewhere in Russia**. Russian heavy equipment is likely [arriving](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821896360423026715) in Kursk Oblast in greater numbers as of August 9. Ukraine has sought to interdict the Russian reinforcements, in one case, [destroying](https://x.com/JohnH105/status/1821808807409746398) a truck column carrying infantry near Rylsk.

**Ukrainian objectives**

- For Ukraine, this offensive likely has multiple aims. First, Kyiv [seeks](https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/08/europe/russia-ukrainian-incursion-intl/index.html?cid=ios_app) to compel Russia to divert forces from other fronts, much like Moscow’s Kharkiv [offensive](https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/05/russias-kharkiv-offensive-stretches-ukrainian-forces.php) in May 2024 did to Ukraine. This goal could be to relieve pressure in Donetsk Oblast, where Ukrainian troops are struggling to hold back Russian advances, or to enable Ukraine to recapture Russian-controlled territory in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

- Second, Kyiv likely sought to reinvigorate Ukrainian morale and Western confidence in Ukraine, reversing the downbeat narrative that has taken hold over the last 10 months. On that score, Ukraine has already achieved some success. The operation has electrified the Ukrainian and Western media while sparking alarm and fury in Russia.

- A possible third aim could be to gain leverage in potential peace negotiations. Russian sources [report](https://t.me/voenkorKotenok/58052) that Ukrainian troops have begun [digging in](https://t.me/rybar/62607), suggesting Kyiv seeks to hold the captured territory at least temporarily.
